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Abstract
This paper develops a novel differentially private framework to solve convex
optimization problems with sensitive optimization data and complex physical
or operational constraints. Unlike standard noise-additive algorithms, that act
primarily on the problem data, objective or solution, and disregard the problem
constraints, this framework requires the optimization variables to be a function of
the noise and exploits a chance-constrained problem reformulation with formal
feasibility guarantees. The noise is calibrated to provide differential privacy for
identity and linear queries on the optimization solution. For many applications,
including resource allocation problems, the proposed framework provides a trade-
off between the expected optimality loss and the variance of optimization results.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) is a rigorous definition of privacy that quantifies and bounds
the risk of disclosing sensitive attributes of datasets used in computations. Differentially private
algorithms ensure privacy by introducing a calibrated noise to the inputs, outputs, or objectives of
computations. It has been successfully applied to a variety of contexts, including histogram queries
(Li et al., 2010), census surveys (Abowd, 2018; Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2019), linear regression
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011) and deep learning (Abadi et al., 2016) to name but a few examples. However,
their applications to constrained optimization problems remains limited, because it is generally hard
to certify the feasibility of differentially private optimization solution.
This paper considers a parametric constrained optimization problems of the form
minimize
z
c(z) subject to Z , {z | Az 6 b, Gz = d}, (1)
with variables z ∈ Rn+, convex cost function c : Rn 7→ R, and convex, compact and non-empty
feasible space Z with parameters A ∈ Rm×n, b ∈ Rm, G ∈ R`×n, and d ∈ R`, with m > 0 and
` > 0. The paper assumes elements c, A, b and G as public, non-sensitive information about the
system design, whereas vector d = {di}`i=1 contains private, sensitive data of every user i, e.g. the
customer loads in an electrical power system. In such applications, the feasible space Z encodes hard
operational constraints or physical laws that must be satisfied.
Releasing queries over the solutions of problem (1) may leak information about the sensitive data d.
For example, in energy network operations, releasing the nodal energy supplies using identity queries,
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or aggregated supply quantities using sum queries, exposes the allocation of energy demand d across
the network (Zhou et al., 2019). Therefore, the goal of this work is to compute such solution z that
makes queries over z differentially private, while also being feasible for problem constraints.
While there exist various differential privacy algorithms to solve convex optimization problems,
their application to constrained problems is limited because they do not generally guarantee that the
privacy-preserving result necessarily satisfies the feasibility conditions. Algorithms based on input
perturbation of the sensitive data d modify the feasible space Z (Dwork et al., 2006; Fukuchi et al.,
2017), thus returning an approximate solution to (1) that may not satisfy the original constraints. The
output perturbation mechanisms (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Rubinstein et al., 2012), that add
noise to the optimization results, generally cannot be certified feasible for Z; see, for example, the
impossibility results of Hsu et al. (2014). The feasibility and near-optimality of the privacy-preserving
results can be restored by leveraging the post-processing immunity of differential privacy. This,
however, requires solving bilevel optimization problems (Mak et al., 2020).
This paper addresses these limitations and develops a new framework that provides both privacy and
feasibility guarantees for constrained optimization problems. Instead of applying the noise to either
the parameters or the results of the optimization, the framework solves a stochastic chance-constrained
optimization problem whose solution is used to sample a solution to (1), which guarantees privacy
and ensures feasibility with high probability. The approach requires a linear dependency between the
optimization variables and the noise (Georghiou et al., 2019) and reveals a novel connection between
differential privacy and stochastic chance-constrained optimization.
Example 1 (Identity queries over z(⇠)). Consider a diagonal matrix E 2 Rn⇥n, such that6
Eii =
⇢
1, if ith element of vector z(⇠) is subject to release,
0, otherwise.
The optimal recourse Z 2 Rn⇥n is made independent from the dataset d if and only if
Z 2 Q(E) , {Z |Z   E = E, Z   (E   diagv(E)1>n ) = 0n⇥n},
which yields zi(⇠) = z˜i + ⇠i if element i is subject to release and zi(⇠) = z˜i + Zi⇠ otherwise.7
Example 2 (Sum queries over z(⇠)). Consider g number of sum statistics made over solution z(⇠)8
and consider matrix L 2 Rn⇥g , such that9
Lij =
⇢
1, if ith element of vector z(⇠) is in group j,
0, otherwise
The pt mal recourse Z 2 Rn⇥g is made independent from the dataset d if and only if
Z 2 Q(L) , {Z |LZ = diag(1p)},
whic yields L>j z(⇠) = L
>
j z˜ + ⇠j , for all groups j = 1, . . . , g.10
z
c
(z
)
de
ns
ity
of
z
(⇠
)
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?
z
○
z˜
Z
 
c
P [z 2 Z]
P [z /2 Z]
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The functioning of the framework is illustrated in the adjacent figure,
showing the projections of solutions z onto cost function c and feasible
space Z . Consider the optimal solution ?z returned by problem (1).
The output perturbation of
?
z results in solutions whose density
?
z (ξ)
(dashed line on the bottom of the figure) is prone to lie outside the
feasible space Z . By restricting the optimization variables to be a
linear function of the noise, e.g., z(ξ) = z˜ + f(ξ) where z˜ is the
expected value of the solution with respect to the random variable
distribution and f(ξ) is the linear functional recourse, the stochastic
problem optimizes z˜ and f(ξ) providing a new probability density of
solution z (solid line). This new density renders any realization of
the noise ξ feasible within a prescribed probability P [z˜ + f(ξ) ∈ Z],
specified by the curator of problem (1). If the functional recourse f(ξ) is made independent from the
sensitive data d, the framework enjoys both privacy and feasibility guarantees. However, it introduces
a trade-off between privacy and the optimality loss with expected value ∆c = E[c(z(ξ))− c( ?z )].
The chance-constrained optimization always ensures the satisfaction of the system Gz = d, which
may represent flow conservation constraints and other physical laws that cannot be violated. This
setting, however, restricts the queries to be made only on strict subsets of solution z, because the
perturbation needs to be redistributed among the variables to guarantee the feasibility of the system.
By separating the solution into released and non-released variables, the latter can be optimized to
provide trade-offs between the optimality loss and its variance, as well as the trade-offs between the
optimality loss and the overall solution variance. The contributions of this work can be summarized
as follows: (1) It develops a novel differentially private framework for the release of identity and
sum queries over the solutions of constrained convex programs, using stochastic chance-constrained
optimization (Section 3). (2) The released solutions are guaranteed feasible with a high probability.
The feasibility guarantees are studied for individual and joint constraint satisfaction, providing higher
or lower optimality losses, respectively (Section 4). (3) The framework establishes a trade-off between
the expected and the worst-case errors by controlling the variance of the optimization results and the
optimality loss (Section 5). (4) On the benchmark energy optimization datasets, the framework is
shown to outperform the standard output perturbation algorithm (Section 6).
Notation Upper and lower case symbols are used to denote, respectively, matrices and vectors. The
indexed notation Ai is used to denote the ith row vector of matrix A. The operator diag(a) returns
the diagonal matrix with entries of vector a, and diagv(A) returns the vector of diagonal elements of
matrix A. The ceil dre maps real number r into the least succeeding integer. Notation ◦ denotes a
Schur product. 0 and 1 respectively denote vectors of zeros and ones of proper dimensions.
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2 Preliminaries
Across the paper, it is assumed that the optimal solution to problem (1) exists and is unique and that
the data di, contributed by each individual i, in d are not correlated. Thus, the problem can be seen as
an algorithmM : R` 7→ Rn with a unique mapping of datasets d to optimization results. To enable
private queries over the optimization results, this work considers a differentially private counterpart
M˜ ofM. While the traditional differential privacy definition aims at protecting the participation of
an individual data (Dwork et al., 2006), this work focuses on obfuscating the magnitude di associated
with participant i of the input vector d. To capture this privacy notion, the paper focuses on the
indistinguishability framework proposed by Chatzikokolakis et al. (2013), which protects the sensitive
data of each individual up to some measurable quantity α > 0 and defines two neighboring datasets
d, d′ (written ∼α) as
d ∼α d′ ⇐⇒ ∃i s.t. |di − d′i| 6 α ∧ dj = d′j ,∀j 6= i,
where d and d′ are input vectors to problem (1) and α is a positive real value. Following previous
work (Muñoz et al., 2019), this relation requires the assumption that the neighboring datasets are
feasible for problem (1), which is not restrictive, as only feasible solutions are of interest to release.
Differential privacy requires that the maximum divergence of the algorithm output distributions on
neighboring inputs to be bounded by privacy parameters ε and δ, such that
P
[
M˜(d) = O
]
6 P
[
M˜(d′) = O
]
exp(ε) + δ
for a random algorithm M˜ and any output O, where P denotes the probability over runs of M˜. If
δ = 0, M˜ is said to be ε-differentially private.
The global sensitivity methods are known to provide differential privacy by augmenting the output of
computations with the noise calibrated to the `1- or `2-sensitivity. The `p−sensitivity
∆α , max
d∼αd′
‖M(d)−M(d′)‖p , p = 1, 2,
is used to bound the change in the algorithm output induced by any two α-indistinguishable inputs.
In many applications of interest, G ∈ {0, 1}`×n is a binary matrix and the domain of datasets d is
normalized in [0, 1]. Thus, ∆α is directly upper-bounded by α.
Let Lap(λ)n denote the i.i.d. Laplace distribution over n dimensions with 0 mean and scale λ. The
following ubiquitous result provides an ε-differentially private algorithm (Dwork et al., 2006).
Theorem 1 (Laplace mechanism). LetM be an algorithm with `1 sensitivity ∆α that maps datasets
d to Rn. The Laplace mechanismM(d) + ξ, with ξ ∼ Lap(∆α/ε)n, attains ε-differential privacy.
3 Internalizing global sensitivity methods into constrained optimization
The direct application of Theorem 1 to the optimal optimization solution may produce a result that
violates the problem constraints. This section introduces a suitable transformation of problem (1) into
a stochastic chance-constrained problem that internalizes the global sensitivity methods to establish
both privacy and constraint feasibility guarantees. This section first discusses the Laplace mechanism
and then extends the results to the Gaussian mechanism.
Consider a random perturbation ξ ∈ Rp calibrated to Laplace distribution Pξ = Lap(∆α/ε)p for some
arbitrary dimension p, and assume that the solution z depends on the realization of ξ as
z(ξ) = z˜ + f(ξ) = z˜ + Zξ, (2)
where z˜ ∈ Rn is the expected value of the solution with respect to distribution Pξ and Zξ is the
linear functional recourse with recourse decision Z ∈ Rn×p, which is used to adjust the expected
solution to any realization of ξ. Therefore, any query made over z(ξ) will constitute the expected
and random components. To provide privacy guarantees, the random component is required to be
independent from data d. This can be achieved by enforcing additional, query-specific, constraints Q
on the recourse Z. While the framework can accommodate the general class of linear queries over
solution z(ξ), for ease of presentation, this work focuses on identity and sum queries.
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Definition 1 (Identity query). This query releases a specified subset of solution z(ξ). Consider a
random perturbation ξ ∈ Rn and a diagonal matrix I ∈ Rn×n, such that
ξi =
{
Lap(∆α/ε),
0,
Iii =
{
1, if ith element of vector z(ξ) is subject to release,
0, otherwise.
The identity query release is thus Iz(ξ) = Iz˜ + IZξ for Z ∈ Rn×n. The random component IZξ is
made independent from the dataset d if the recourse decision Z is constrained as follows
Z ∈ Q(I) , {Z |Z ◦ I = I, Z ◦ (I − diagv(I)1>n ) = 0n×n},
which yields Iz(ξ) =
{
z˜i + ξi, if Iii = 1,
0, otherwise.
Definition 2 (Sum query). This query releases p sum statistics over non-intersecting subsets of z(ξ).
Consider a random perturbation ξ ∈ Rp and a matrix S ∈ Rp×n, such that
Sij =
{
1, if element zj(ξ) participates in sum statistic i,
0, otherwise.
The sum query releases Sz(ξ) = Sz˜ + SZξ for Z ∈ Rn×p. The random component SZξ is made
independent from the dataset d if the recourse decision Z is constrained as follows
Z ∈ Q(S) , {Z |SZ = diag(1p)},
which yields Sz(ξ) = Sz˜ + ξ.
To produce random solutions to (1), function (2) is optimized using the following stochastic program
minimize
z˜,Z∈Q
EPξ [c(z˜ + Zξ)] (3a)
subject to Pξ [A(z˜ + Zξ) 6 b] > 1− η, (3b)
G(z˜ + Zξ) = d Pξ-a.s., (3c)
which optimizes z˜ and Z by anticipating all realizations of the random variable ξ. This problem
minimizes the expected value of the convex cost function (3a) with respect to the random variable ξ.
The problem constraints are given by a set of probabilistic constraints. The joint chance constraint
(3b) requires the satisfaction of the inequality constraints with a prescribed probability 1−η, specified
by the curator of problem (3). The almost sure constraint (3c) requires the equality constraints to
hold with probability 1. Note that, if problem (3) is infeasible, it follows that the privacy parameters
α and ε are too strong for the feasibility requirement η.
As the recourse of problem (3) amounts to finitely-dimensional linear functions, objective function
(3a) and chance constraint (3b) admit computationally tractable reformulations (Ben-Tal et al., 2009)
(additional details will be given in Section 4). The almost sure constraint (3c) includes a random
variable and, therefore, satisfying it is computationally intractable. However, it can be equivalently
reformulated using the following set of equations:
Gz˜ = d, GZ = 0. (4)
If variables z˜ and Z are subject to (4), their optimal solution satisfies the equality constraint (3c) for
any realization of ξ. The structural properties of G restrict the set of potential queries and a query is
said to be implementable if there exists Z ∈ Q such that GZ = 0 holds.
Example (Flow conservation constraint). Assume G ∈ R`×n represents the incidence matrix of a
fully connected graph G (its rank is n− 1) and that Gz = d represents a flow conservation constraint.
Consider an identity query Iz(ξ) = Iz˜+ IZξ and Z ∈ Q(I) as in Definition 1. The identity query is
implementable if Tr[I] < n, i.e., not all elements of Z are constrained by Q(I) and GZ = 0 holds.
The constraint GZ = 0 plays a critical role: it balances the perturbation between the released and
non-disclosed variables. As a result, the query should leave enough degree of freedom to satisfy the
equality constraint. This limitation is solely induced by the need to preserve the satisfaction of the
equality constraint and it is not seen as a limiting factor for many applications (see Section 6).
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Algorithm 1: Private identity query (PIQ)
1 Input: d,∆α, ε, η, I
2 (
?
z˜ ,
?
Z )← Solve (3) for Z ∈ Q(I)
3 ξˆ ← Sample from Lap(∆α/ε)n
4 Compute solution to (1) as zˆ =
?
z˜ +
?
Z ξˆ
5 Release: Izˆ
Algorithm 2: Private sum query (PSQ)
1 Input: d,∆α, ε, η, S
2 (
?
z˜ ,
?
Z )← Solve (3) for Z ∈ Q(S)
3 ξˆ ← Sample from Lap(∆α/ε)p
4 Compute solution to (1) as zˆ =
?
z˜ +
?
Z ξˆ
5 Release: Szˆ
Private identity query (PIQ) algorithm The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1, which
takes as inputs the dataset d, the `1-sensitivity of the identity query, the privacy ε and feasibility η
requirements, the known covariance Σ, and the query specification I . Upon receiving the optimal
chance-constrained solution (line 2), the algorithm draws a sample from the Laplace distribution
(line 3) and computes a (1− η)-feasible solution for problem (1) (line 4). The algorithm returns an
ε-differentially private identity query which satisfies problem (1) constraints with probability (1− η).
Theorem 2 (ε-differentially PIQ). Algorithm 1 is ε-differentially private, i.e.,
P
[
I
( ?
z (d)+
?
Z (d)ξ
)
= O
]
6 P
[
I
( ?
z (d′)+
?
Z (d
′)ξ
)
= O
]
exp(ε)
for any two α−neighboring datasets d and d′ and output solutions O.
Private sum query (PSQ) algorithm The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2, which differs
from Algorithm 1 by the query specification S and the noise dimension.
Theorem 3 (ε-differentially PSQ). Algorithm 2 is ε-differentially private, i.e.,
P
[
S(
?
z (d)+
?
Z (d))ξ = O
]
6 P
[
S(
?
z (d′)+
?
Z (d
′))ξ = O
]
exp(ε) (5)
for any two α−neighboring datasets d and d′ and output solutions O.
In addition to releasing a privacy-preserving answer with a probabilistic feasibility certificate, the
proposed framework also allows to verify the feasibility of the sampled solution zˆ without incurring
an additional privacy loss. Since the equality constraint holds due to (4), it is sufficient to verify the
feasibility of constraint Azˆ 6 b without accessing the original data d. The operation is private by
post-processing immunity of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2014).
Furthermore, since formulation (3) is independent from the distribution of the noise, the framework
can accommodate other global sensitivity methods. In particular, the following result holds.
Theorem 4 (Gaussian algorithms). Let δ, ε ∈ (0, 1) and let ∆2α be the `2−sensitivity. Algorithms 1
and 2 that calibrate ξ ∈ N (0, σ2) to the Gaussian distribution with σ > ∆2α
√
2 ln(1.25/δ)/ε satisfy
(ε, δ)- differential privacy.
The relation between the feasibility requirement η and the privacy parameters ε and δ is implicit
in the formulation of the chance-constrained problem: the variance of the noise affects the ability
to satisfy the problem constraints within the feasibility requirement and vice-versa. To render this
relation explicit, Appendix D discusses a version of Algorithms 1 and 2 that iterates lines 3 to 5 an
optimal number T of times to guarantee the release of a feasible solution with probability 1− µ, for
some 0 < µ < 1.
Theorem 5 (Composition to improve feasibility). Given feasibility requirement η, privacy parameter
ε/T , and value 0 < µ < 1, the iterative variants of Algorithms 1 and 2 return an ε-differentially
private solution that is feasible with probability at least 1− µ within T = d log(µ)log(η) e steps.
4 Reformulations and feasibility guarantees
The optimization problem (3) is intractable because it constitutes the optimization of a random
variable. However, due to the convexity assumption on (1), linear functional recourse and known
distribution of ξ, problem (3) admits tractable reformulations. There are several avenues to reformulate
the joint chance constraint (3) with different degrees of conservatism in terms of expected optimality
loss (Nemirovski and Shapiro, 2007). This work provides a conservative joint constraint satisfaction
guarantee, using a sample approximation, and a less conservative individual constraint satisfaction
guarantee, using an analytic reformulation. The objective function is reformulated as follows.
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Objective function reformulation Consider a quadratic cost function with first- and second-order
coefficients c1 ∈ Rn and c2 ∈ Rn, and a diagonal covariance matrix Σ = E[ξξ>] with diagonal
elements being equal to λ = ∆α/ε. Then, the objective function (3a) reformulates as
EPξ
[
c>1 (z + Zξ) + (z + Zξ)
>diag(c2)(z + Zξ)
]
= c>1 z + z
>diag(c2)z + Tr
[
Z>diag(c2)ZΣ
]
,
which follows from the zero-mean distribution Pξ and the fact that E[ξξ>] = Σ. Notice that for the
affine cost functions, the analytic reformulation of (3a) reduces to c>1 z.
Sample approximation This approximation substitutes the chance constraint (3b) with a finite
number of deterministic constraints, each enforced on a specific realization of random perturbation
(Campi and Garatti, 2008; Alamo et al., 2010; Margellos et al., 2014). This work invokes the sample
approximation method from (Margellos et al., 2014), which enforces (3b) on the vertices of the
rectangular sample set extracted from distribution Pξ, i.e., for ξ ∈ Rp
Pξ [(A(z + Zξ) 6 b)] > 1− η ≡ Az 6 b−AZξˆv, ∀v = 1, . . . , 2p, (6)
where ξˆv ∈ R2p is the vth vertex of the extracted sample set. Margellos et al. (2014) show that the
joint constraint satisfaction is attained if the number of samples N from Pξ is properly chosen.
Theorem 6 (Margellos et al. (2014)). The equivalence (6) holds with confidence (1 − β) if the
rectangular set is built upon S samples extracted from Pξ, with N at least as much as
N >
⌈
1
η
e
e− 1
(
2p− 1 + ln 1
β
)⌉
.
Finally, notice that this approximation requires an additional input β to Algorithms 1 and 2 to
accommodate the confidence level of the data curator.
Analytic reformulation The joint chance constraint (3b) can be rewritten as a union of individual
chance constraints. For some vector η ∈ Rm+ of individual constraint violation probabilities, the
individual chance constraints can be reformulated exactly using second-order cone constraints (Ben-
Tal and Nemirovski, 2001):
Aiz 6 bi − f(1− ηi)
∥∥∥AiZΣ1/2∥∥∥
2
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, (7)
where f(1− ηi) is a distribution-dependent safety parameter and Σ1/2 is the lower triangular matrix
resulting from the Cholesky factorization of Σ. For any symmetric and unimodal distribution of ξ,
f(1− ηi) amounts to (2/9ηi)1/2 if 0 6 ηi 6 1/6 (see the result from Van Parys et al. (2016)). For the
Gaussian distribution of ξ, f(1−ηi) amounts to the inverse CDF of the standard Gaussian distribution
at (1− ηi)−quantile (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2001). Observe that, for the fixed parameter ηi, the
last term in the right-hand side of (7) is a safety margin, which reduces the feasible space of the
original problem (1) to guarantee individual constraint feasibility for (1− ηi) realizations of ξ.
If 1>η 6 η holds, the individual chance constraints guarantee joint constraint satisfaction probability
η. Yet, finding the optimal value η is an NP- hard problem (Xie et al., 2019). Section 6, shows that,
for small problem instances, the choice η = η results in the desired joint constraint satisfaction while
providing a significantly less conservative solution than the sample approximation.
5 Variance-aware differentially private algorithms
For many systems governed by the solution of problem (1), e.g. energy networks, it is important
to control the impact of the differentially private solutions on the optimality loss (e.g., extra supply
cost) and the variance of the state variables (e.g., supply and flow allocations). This section extends
Algorithms 1 and 2 to provide a minimal variance solution without affecting the privacy guarantees.
Minimal variance of optimality loss The chance-constrained problems of Algorithms 1 and 2
optimize against the expected value of the cost function. Its solution provides the estimate of the
expected optimality loss relative to the solution of problem (1). The worst-case outcome of the
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optimality loss, however, may significantly exceed the expected value. A trade-off between the
expected and worst-case outcomes can be attained by controlling the variance of the optimality loss.
As the value of the cost function of problem (1) is deterministic, it is sufficient to control the variance
of (3a) to attain the desired result. For a linear cost function, the variance admits a convex expression
Var
[
c>1 (z + Zξ)
]
= Tr
[
Z>diag(c1)diag(c1)ZΣ
]
in recourse variable Z. Therefore, it can be
minimized by optimizing, instead, the following objective function
minimize
z,Z∈Q
(1− ϕ)EPξ [c>1 (z + Zξ)]+ ϕ∥∥∥Σ1/2Z>c1∥∥∥
2
, (8)
which optimizes the trade-off between the expected value and the standard deviation of the cost
function for some factor ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, varying the factor ϕ establishes a Pareto frontier between
the optimality loss and its variance. Since the recourse decision Z is subject to query-specific
constraints Q, the results of Theorems 2 and 3 hold. Finally, the variance of the non-affine cost
functions does not permit convex formulations and is not considered in this paper.
Minimal variance of optimization variables The variance of the optimization solution z (ξ) =
z + Zξ admits a convex expression Var [z (ξ)] = Tr
[
Z>ΣZ
]
in Z. Therefore, it can be controlled
by optimizing the recourse decision Z using the following objective function
minimize
z,Z∈Q
(1− ϕ)EPξ [c(z + Zξ)] + ϕ
∥∥∥ZΣ1/21∥∥∥
2
, (9)
which finds the optimal trade-off between the expected cost and the standard deviation of the
optimization variables for some factor ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the optimal recourse is still guided by the
query-specific constraints, the privacy guarantees provided by Theorems 2 and 3 are preserved.
6 Experiments
Problem description The proposed framework is applied to the energy resource allocation problem
using a set of benchmark networks from (Coffrin et al., 2018). The problem goal is to compute the
cost-optimal supply allocations across the network to satisfy nodal demands while respecting the
supply and network limits. The problem is described by an undirected graphs G(N,E) with a set of
nodes N and a set of edges E, connecting those nodes. The graph typology is represented by the
weighted Laplacian matrix B formed from non-negative edge weights β ∈ R|E|+ . The nodal supply
p ∈ R|N |+ is allocated in the network to meet nodal demand d ∈ R|N |+ . The flow along the edges is
modeled considering a vector of nodal potentials θ ∈ R|N |, their difference is proportional to the
network flows, i.e., the flow in edge ` amounts to f`(θ) = β`(θs(`) − θr(`)),∀` ∈ E, with operators
s(`) and r(`) returning the sending and receiving nodes of edge `, respectively. Finally, the nodal
supply incurs costs computed by function c : R|N | 7→ R. This allocation problem gives rise to the
following optimization
minimize
p,θ
c(p) (10a)
subject to Bθ = p− d (10b)
p 6 p 6 p (10c)
f 6 f(θ) 6 f. (10d)
The objective function minimizes the total supply cost, while the equality constraint balances nodal
demand, supply, and net flow injection. The inequality constraints respect the minimum and maximum
nodal supply and the network flow limits p, p ∈ R|N |+ , f ∈ R|E|− , f ∈ R|E|+ . A rearrangement of the
terms in (10b)-(10d) makes the problem representable in the form expressed by problem (1), thus its
chance-constrained counterpart is achieved as detailed in Sections 3 and 4.
The experiments concern the identity and sum queries made over the subset of nodal supplies p and
make use of the `1−sensitivity ∆α of vector p on the two α−indistinguishable datasets d and d′.
Consider the optimal supply allocations
?
p and
?
p ′ obtained, respectively, on datasets d and d′.
Proposition 1. ∆α =
∥∥ ?p− ?p ′∥∥
1
6 α.
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Proof. The equality constraint (10b) requires the balance between the total supply and total demand.
By construction,
∑
i∈N [B
?
θ ]i = 0, thus from (10b) it follows∑
i∈N
?
p i −
∑
i∈N
di = 0∑
i∈N
?
p ′
i −
∑
i∈N
d′i = 0,
therefore, ∑
i∈N
?
p i −
∑
i∈N
?
p ′
i =
∑
i∈N
di −
∑
i∈N
d′i 6 α,
because the datasets d and d′ differ by at most α in one entry, i.e., ‖d− d′‖1 6 α. Therefore,
∆α =
∥∥ ?p− ?p ′∥∥
1
6 α.
Experimental setup The experiments are organized as follows. For every network instance, the
variable limits are fixed, while cost coefficients and nodal demands are i.i.d. drawn from the following
uniform distributions c1 ∼ U(1, 3), c2 ∼ U(1/10, 3/10), and d ∼ U(1/2, 1). The results are thus
reported for 100 independent simulation runs. The identity and sum queries are made over an
arbitrary set of 30% of nodal supplies, which is sampled at every simulation run. The privacy loss
parameter ε is set to 1 and the indistinguishability parameter α is set to 0.1 for identity queries and 0.5
for sum queries. As `1-sensitivity ∆α is bounded by α, random perturbations thus obey the Laplace
distribution Lap(α). The feasibility requirements for the joint and individual constraint satisfaction
are set uniformly at η = η = 2.5%, and the out-of-sample empirical constraint violation probability
is obtained for 1000 samples at every simulation run.
Privacy-preserving algorithms The algorithm abbreviations PIQ and PSQ are appended by -a
or -s to indicate whether the chance constraints are reformulated, respectively, analytically or by
samples (Section 4). They are compared with the output perturbation OP algorithm, which adds noise
to the query answer. The OP solution is said to be feasible if problem (1) returns a feasible solution
for the fixed solution of the OP algorithm.
Implementation The simulations were carried out using the standard PC with Intel Core i5 3.4 GHz
processor and 8 GB memory. Solving optimization problems with the analytic reformulation requires
less than a few seconds on average, whereas the sample approximation of the chance constraints
requires by at most 78 seconds on average. The optimization models were implemented in the Julia
Language and the source code can be accessed at https://github.com/wdvorkin/DP_CO_FG.
Algorithm comparison The algorithms are compared in terms of their ability to release private
queries while satisfying the feasibility requirement. Table 1 summarizes the results for identity query
answers obtained on several networks differing by the number of variables (n) and constraints (|Z|).
The results indicate that the OP algorithm returns private answers that violate the problem constraints
at a far greater rate that the one imposed by the requirement η. Additionally, its performance degrades
with the increase of the problem size. The application of PIQ-a,on the other hand, provides formal
guarantees for the individual constraint satisfaction. These guarantees suffice to attain the desired
feasibility requirement for smaller network instances. However, with an increasing network size, the
probability of violating multiple constraints increases, and the average PIQ-a feasibility performance
reduces. To guarantee the joint constraint satisfaction within the prescribed probability 1− η, the
PIQ-s uses a sample approximation. While the guarantees are attained, notice that (last four columns
of the table) this algorithm generates solutions with larger optimality loss than those generated by
PIQ-a, reflecting the discussion in Section 5.
Next, Table 2 reports the results for the sum queries made over the largest test case 118_ieee.These
sum queries return a single aggregated statistic for the subset of selected nodes (first row of the table),
or return the sums over 3, 6, or 9 partitions of the selected nodes. A single statistic requires one
perturbation, which is accommodated by all algorithms in a feasible manner. With an increasing
number of statistics, however, the differences between OP and PSQ algorithms are clearly observed.
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Table 1: Identity query summary for 100 network data samples
Case ID n× |Z|
Empirical constraint violation P[zˆ /∈ Z] [%] Optimality loss ∆c [%]
OP PIQ-a PIQ-s PIQ-a PIQ-s
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
3_lmbd 6×17 29.7 23.07 0.64 0.34 0.27 0.31 3.42 3.55 5.72 7.64
5_pjm 10×29 18.32 22.94 0.39 0.41 0.12 0.3 1.22 2.07 2.04 3.03
14_ieee 28×84 52.24 26.85 1.48 0.78 0.27 0.25 1.55 1.33 3.45 2.88
39_epri 78×211 95.56 4.69 4.86 1.32 0.49 0.35 2.17 0.81 4.7 1.68
57_ieee 114×333 98.59 1.91 7.17 1.50 1.28 1.06 2.4 0.78 5.51 5.06
118_ieee 236×728 99.99 0.02 14.35 2.06 1.51 0.47 2.46 0.56 4.89 1.20
Table 2: Sum query summary for 100 network data samples
qu
er
ie
s
# Empirical constraint violation P[zˆ /∈ Z] [%] Optimality loss ∆c [%]
OP PSQ-a PSQ-s PSQ-a PSQ-s
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.62 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.11
6 16.48 20.2 1.39 0.84 0.2 0.24 0.58 0.32 1.81 0.82
9 59.83 23.6 4.94 1.11 1.00 0.92 2.36 1.01 13.35 7.31
Variance-aware differentially private optimization The last experiments show the ability of
the chance-constrained framework to control the variance of the optimization results by means of
Equations (8) and (9). Due to the inherent dependency between the optimality loss and the cost values,
the results are given for different degrees of sparsity (c¯) of supply cost among network nodes. Figure 1
illustrates the results for the PSQ-a algorithm releasing 9 sum statistics for the 118_ieee case and for
the various assignments of the trade-off parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. The left plot shows that independently
of cost sparsity, the algorithm can produce a differentially private output at zero variance of the
optimality loss. The right plot demonstrates the drastic reduction of the overall solution variance
Var [z(ξ)] = Tr
[
Z>ΣZ
]
, almost to the Tr[Σ] total variance of the 9 random perturbations. Both
results, however, require larger conservatism of the solution in terms of optimality loss.
20 25 30 35
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E [∆c]
V
ar
[∆
c]
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Tr[Σ] = 4.5
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)]
Figure 1: Trade-offs: expected value of optimality loss vs. variance (left) and vs. variance of
optimization solution (right). The results are given for c1∼U [1, c] and averaged over 100 runs.
7 Related work
There is a large body of work on differentially private algorithms for convex optimization in the
context of empirical risk minimization (ERM) problems. Output perturbation algorithms (Chaudhuri
and Monteleoni, 2009; Rubinstein et al., 2012) focus on adding the noise to the optimization results.
Objective perturbation algorithms (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) perturb the optimization objective and
perform well for smooth loss functions. Exponential sampling algorithms (McSherry and Talwar,
2007; Bassily et al., 2014) rely on an evaluation function to select a candidate output, while achieving
(ε, 0)-differential privacy that may be difficult to implement due to the exponential nature of evaluation
function. Finally, noisy stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithms (Abadi et al., 2016; Song et al.,
2013; Bassily et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015) provide a privacy-preserving version of SGD that can
be combined with accountant methods to provide tight bounds. All these algorithms, however, are
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meant for a particular class of unconstrained or regularized convex optimization problems and do not
focus on reporting solutions that must satisfy problem constraints.
The contributions on differentially private constrained convex optimization for generic decision-
making problems are much more sparse. Gupta et al. (2010) studied differential privacy in combi-
natorial optimization problems and derived information-theoretic bounds on the task utility. Hsu
et al. (2014) proposed to solve linear programs privately using a differentially private variant of
the multiplicative weights mechanism. Han et al. (2014) focused on a particular class of convex
optimization problems whose objective function is piecewise affine, with the possibility of including
linear inequality constraints. Fioretto et al. (2020) proposed a private data-release mechanism relying
on projections to restore the feasibility of the violated constraints due to input perturbation. Finally,
Muñoz et al. (2019) developed a differentially private algorithm for a class of linear programs that
solely include the inequality constraints whose right-hand side contains sensitive data. The work
relies on the input perturbation of the inequality right-hand sides to achive (ε, δ)−differential privacy.
There are also differential privacy proposals for the distributed convex optimization. A privacy-
preserving version of the alternating direction method of multipliers (Boyd et al., 2011) has been
studied in the context of the unconstrained ERM problem (Zhang and Zhu, 2016; Ding et al., 2019) and
constrained energy resource allocation problem (Dvorkin et al., 2019). Han et al. (2016) proposed a
private distributed projected gradient descent algorithm for constrained convex optimization problems.
This collection of work, however, minimizes the privacy leakage by acting on the information
exchanged by agents during the coordination process and does not provide privacy guarantees for the
release of optimization solution.
8 Conclusion
The paper proposed a novel framework to release privacy-preserving solutions of constrained convex
optimization problems that contain complex feasibility constraints. The framework relies on a
combination of differential privacy and stochastic optimization theory and provides the foundations
for two algorithms answering privacy-preserving identity and sum queries over the optimization
solutions. The feasibility guarantees were studied for both individual and joint constraint satisfaction
and the paper examined the trade-off between the expected and the worst-case errors by controlling
the variance of the solutions and the optimality loss. Finally, the proposed framework was shown to
outperform standard output perturbation algorithms on several energy benchmark networks.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider that the identity query Iz(ξ) = Iz˜ + IZξ requires
releasing first k items of z(ξ), such that the diagonal matrix I can be described as
I =
[
diag(1)k×k
diag(0)n−k×n−k
]
,
the perturbation vector ξ as
ξ =
[
ξ1, . . . , ξk, 0
>
n−k
]>
,
and an arbitrary identity outcome O as
O =
[
O1, . . . , Ok, 0
>
n−k×n−k
]>
.
Denote the optimal solution of the chance-constrained problem (3) by
?
z˜ and
?
Z . It needs to
be shown that the ratio of probabilities that the algorithm returns the same outcome O on two
α−indistinguishable input datasets d and d′ is bounded by a constant exp (ε):
P
[
I
(
?
z˜ (d)+
?
Z (d)ξ
)
= O
]
/ P
[
I
(
?
z˜ (d′)+
?
Z (d
′)ξ
)
= O
]
6 exp (ε) .
It follows that:
P
[
I
?
z˜ (d) + I
?
Z (d)ξ = O
]
/ P
[
I
?
z˜ (d′) + I
?
Z (d
′)ξ = O
]
(i)
=
P


?
z˜ 1(d)
...
?
z˜ k(d)
0n−k
+

ξ1
...
ξk
0n−k
 =

O1
...
Ok
0n−k


P


?
z˜ 1(d
′)
...
?
z˜ k(d
′)
0n−k
+

ξ1
...
ξk
0n−k
 =

O1
...
Ok
0n−k


(ii)
=
P

ξ1...
ξk
 =
O1...
Ok
−

?
z˜ 1(d)
...
?
z˜ k(d)


P

ξ1...
ξk
 =
O1...
Ok
−

?
z˜ 1(d
′)
...
?
z˜ k(d
′)


(iii)
=
∏k
i=1 exp
(
− ε‖Oi−
?
z˜i(d)‖
1
∆α
)
∏k
i=1 exp
(
− ε‖Oi−
?
z˜i(d′)‖
1
∆α
) = k∏
i=1
exp
ε
∥∥∥Oi− ?z˜ i(d′)∥∥∥
1
− ε
∥∥∥Oi− ?z˜ i(d)∥∥∥
1
∆α

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(iv)
6
k∏
i=1
exp
ε
∥∥∥ ?z˜ i(d)− ?z˜ i(d′)∥∥∥
1
∆α
 = exp
ε
∥∥∥ ?z˜ (d)− ?z˜ (d′)∥∥∥
1
∆α
 (v)6 exp (ε) ,
where (i) is obtained from the primal feasibility condition Z ∈ Q(I), which enforces independence
between the query random component and the sensitive data (see Definition 1), (ii) comes from
rearranging the terms and removing zero entries, (iii) is due to the definition of the probability density
function of the Laplace distribution, (iv) follows the reverse inequality of norms, and (v) is from the
definition of `1−sensitivity on α−indistinguishable input datasets.
B Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider that the sum query Sz(ξ) = S(z˜+Zξ) requires releasing
p amount of sum statistics over non-intersecting subsets of z(ξ). We thus need to show that the ratio
of probabilities that the algorithm returns the same outcome O ∈ Rp, i.e.,
P
[
S(
?
z˜ (d)+
?
Z (d))ξ = O
]
/ P
[
S(
?
z˜ (d′)+
?
Z (d
′))ξ = O
]
6 exp(ε),
is bounded by a constant exp(ε), where S ∈ Rp×n and ξ ∈ Rp as in Defintion 2. By denoting the
optimal solution of the chance-constrained problem (3) by
?
z˜and
?
Z , this ratio writes as
P
[
S
?
z˜ (d) + S
?
Z (d)ξ = O
]
P
[
S
?
z˜ (d′) + S
?
Z (d′)ξ = O
] (i)= P
[
S
?
z˜ (d) + ξ = O
]
P
[
S
?
z˜ (d′) + ξ = O
] = P
[
ξ = O − S ?z˜ (d)
]
P
[
ξ = O − S ?z˜ (d′)
]
(ii)
=
∏p
i=1 exp
(
− ε‖Oi−[S
?
z˜ (d)]i‖
1
∆α
)
∏p
i=1 exp
(
− ε‖Oi−[S
?
z˜ (d′)]i‖
1
∆α
) = p∏
i=1
exp
ε
∥∥∥Oi − [S ?z˜ (d′)]i∥∥∥
1
− ε
∥∥∥Oi − [S ?z˜ (d)]i∥∥∥
1
∆α

(iii)
6
p∏
i=1
exp
ε
∥∥∥[S ?z˜ (d)]i − [S ?z˜ (d′)]i∥∥∥
1
∆α
 = exp
ε
∥∥∥S ?z˜ (d)− S ?z˜ (d′)∥∥∥
1
∆α
 (iv)6 exp (ε) ,
where (i) follows from the primal feasibility condition Z ∈ Q(S), which requires the random
component of the sum query to be independent from the data (see Definition 2), (ii) is due to the
definition of the probability density function of the Laplace distribution, (iii) follows from the reserve
inequality of norms, and (iv) is from the `1−sensitivity of the sum query, which is identical to the
`1−sensitivity of the identity query.
C Proof of Theorem 4
Similarly to the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, the random components of the identity and linear queries
can be shown to be independent from a datasets d and d′ using the query specific feasibility conditions
Q. The reminder of the proof can be obtained by following the same steps of the proof in (Dwork
et al., 2006, Appendix A), using notation f(d) = I
?
z˜ (d) for the identity query and f(d) = S
?
z˜ (d)
for the sum query, where f(·) is the function of interest in (Dwork et al., 2006, Appendix A).
D Proof of Theorem 5
The iterative versions of the Algorithms 1 and 2 are provided, respectively, in Algorithms 3 and 4.
Proof. Consider the optimal solution (
?
z˜ ,
?
Z ) returned by the chance constraint problem (line 2) and
recall that the sampling process (lines 4–5) generates a (1− η)-feasible solution zˆ.
The new algorithms, illustrated in Algorighms 3 and 4, alternate this step with a constraint satisfaction
test (line 6) for a maximum number of number T of times with the goal of generating a solution that
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Algorithm 3: Private identity query (PIQ)
1 Input: d,∆α, ε, η, µ, I
2 (
?
z˜ ,
?
Z )← Solve (3) for Z ∈ Q(I) and
ξ ∼ Lap(T∆α/ε)
3 for i = 1, . . . , T = d log(µ)log(η) e do
4 ξˆ ← Sample from Lap(T∆α/ε)n
5 Compute solution to (1) as zˆ =
?
z˜ +
?
Z ξˆ
6 if Azˆ 6 b ∨ i = T then
7 Release: Izˆ
8 end
9 end
Algorithm 4: Private sum query (PSQ)
1 Input: d,∆α, ε, η, µ, S
2 (
?
z˜ ,
?
Z )← Solve (3) for Z ∈ Q(S) and
ξ ∼ Lap(T∆αε)
3 for i = 1, . . . , T = d log(µ)log(η) e do
4 ξˆ ← Sample from Lap(T∆α/ε)p
5 Compute solution to (1) as zˆ =
?
z˜ +
?
Z ξˆ
6 if Azˆ 6 b ∨ i = T then
7 Release: Szˆ
8 end
9 end
satisfies the problem constraints with probability at least 1− µ. Recall that the constraint satisfaction
test, performed in line 6, can be achieved at no extra privacy loss (see Section 3 for details).
The repetition of such process can be seen as a sequence of independent Bernulli trials, each with
probability 1− η of success (i.e., zˆ satisfies the problem constraints) and probability η of failure (i.e.,
zˆ violates the problem constraints). Let FAIL be the discrete random variable describing the number
of unsuccessful trials prior to the first success. Thus, FAIL is described by a Geometric random
variable with probability (1− η). Formally, the goal is described by the following problem:
T , arg min
T
P(FAIL > T ) 6 µ,
requiring that the first success is seen after T trials with probability no larger than µ. Using a
Geometric distribution of order T , it follows that:
P(FAIL > T ) = 1− P(FAIL < T )
= 1− (1− η)
T−1∑
i=1
ηi
= 1− (1− η)1− η
T
1− η = η
T
Thus, the solution to the minimizer above is for T =
⌈
log(µ)
log(η)
⌉
.
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